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One of the most pressing issues in patent and antitrust law today 
involves agreements by which brand-name drug companies pay generic 
firms to delay entering the market. In June 2013, in FTC v. Actavis, Inc., the 
U.S. Supreme Court concluded that these “exclusion payment”1 settlements 
(in which exclusion comes from the payment rather than the patent) could 
have “significant anticompetitive effects” and violate the antitrust laws.2 
In ensuring a robust role for antitrust analysis, the Court handed down 
one of the most important business cases in the past generation. And it 
articulated a blueprint for future analysis based on antitrust law’s “rule of 
reason.” But the Court did not specify every step in the analysis or consider 
every type of settlement. Instead, it called on “lower courts . . . [to] 
structur[e] . . . the present rule-of-reason antitrust litigation.”3 
Along these lines, two recent district court rulings portend ominous 
signs. In the first case, In re Lamictal Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litigation, 
the District of New Jersey granted a motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ challenge 
to a settlement on a drug treating epilepsy and bipolar disorder.4 In doing 
so, the Lamictal court used the five factors that the Actavis Court had 
employed to justify more aggressive antitrust scrutiny to instead excuse its 
decision to employ less vigorous scrutiny. Just as concerning, it substituted 
its own armchair analysis for the burdens of proof articulated in Actavis. 
In the second case, In re Loestrin 24 FE Antitrust Litigation, the Rhode 
Island District Court relied on Lamictal’s flawed framework to grant 
motions to dismiss plaintiffs’ challenge to a settlement delaying generic 
entry of an oral contraceptive.5 The court agonized over the “close call” 
presented by the case while failing to recognize that it was its own 
following of the Lamictal court’s framework that led it into briar patches of 
 
* Distinguished Professor, Rutgers Law School. Copyright © 2014 Michael A. Carrier. I would like 
to thank Steve Shadowen for helpful comments. 
1
  Payments from brands to generics are often called “reverse payments” because the payment flows 
from patentee to alleged infringer (unlike typical settlements in which alleged infringers pay to enter the 
market). This Essay uses the phrase “exclusion payments,” which better captures the exclusion that 
brands can obtain by paying generics to delay entering the market. 
2
  133 S. Ct. 2223, 2237–38 (2013) [http://perma.cc/W67P-MU74]. 
3
  Id. at 2238. 
4
  No. 12–cv–995 (WHW), 2014 WL 282755 (D.N.J. Jan. 24, 2014) [http://perma.cc/A5GN-Q6TE]. 
5
  MDL No. 13–2472–S–PAS, 2014 WL 4368924 (D.R.I. Sept. 4, 2014) [http://perma.cc/GT72-
TGLW]. 
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confusion, uncomfortable policy conclusions, neglect of pleading standards, 
and encouragement of conduct that it knew would “evade [antitrust] 
scrutiny.”6 
If the Lamictal and Loestrin decisions are upheld and adopted by other 
courts, plaintiffs will face insurmountable hurdles, rendering the landmark 
Actavis decision nothing more than a dead letter. This Essay shows that the 
Lamictal and Loestrin courts erred in (1) applying a framework never 
anticipated in Actavis; (2) ignoring crucial holdings from Actavis; and (3) 
amassing unjustified powers for themselves. 
By blocking affordable generic prescription drugs, exclusion-payment 
settlements cost consumers billions of dollars and have profound 
consequences for public health. But if the trend unleashed by the Lamictal 
and Loestrin cases is not quickly reversed, courts will be relegated to the 
role of traffic cops waving anticompetitive settlements through flashing 
green lights of judicial “scrutiny.” 
II. ACTAVIS 
In Actavis, the Supreme Court issued a landmark ruling on the 
application of antitrust law to exclusion-payment settlements. Most 
important, it held that the existence of a patent did not immunize such 
settlements from antitrust scrutiny. The Court found that “it would be 
incongruous to determine antitrust legality by measuring [a] settlement’s 
anticompetitive effects solely against patent law policy, rather than by 
measuring them against procompetitive antitrust policies as well.”7 
Actavis was a significant ruling. In most of the decade before the 
Court’s decision, nearly all the appellate courts that had examined 
exclusion-payment settlements concluded that they did not present antitrust 
concern because they fell within the scope of the patent.8 As applied by 
these courts, judges relied on the mere existence of a patent—even one that 
was invalid or not infringed—to justify any payment.9 In contrast, in 
recognizing the anticompetitive effects of a payment for a potential rival to 




  Id. at *12–13. 
7
  Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2231. 
8
  See, e.g., In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2008) 
(“The essence of the inquiry is whether the agreements restrict competition beyond the exclusionary 
zone of the patent.”) [http://perma.cc/P7NU-WEK9]; In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 
187, 213 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that the settlement did not “unlawfully extend the reach” of the patent) 
[http://perma.cc/A6X7-NG3J]; Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1072 (11th Cir. 2005) 
(finding that the exclusion payments were “within the patent’s exclusionary power”) 
[http://perma.cc/33PW-R8NW]. 
9
  The courts only carved out exceptions for fraud before the Patent Office or sham litigation. See, 
e.g., Ciprofloxacin, 544 F.3d at 1337; FTC v. Watson Pharms., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298, 1312 (11th Cir. 
2012) [http://perma.cc/4NT-FZB7]. 
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The Court in Actavis found that a brand’s payment “amounts to a 
purchase by the patentee of the exclusive right to sell its product, a right it 
already claims but would lose if the patent litigation were to continue and 
the patent were held invalid or not infringed by the generic product.”10 The 
Court worried that “a party with no claim for damages . . . walks away with 
money simply so it will stay away from the patentee’s market.”11 And it 
lamented that “payment in return for staying out of the market . . . simply 
keeps prices at patentee-set levels,” which leads to gains for the patentee 
and challenger but losses for the consumer.12 
In addition to subjecting exclusion-payment settlements to antitrust 
scrutiny, the Court made clear that future courts should analyze such 
agreements under the rule of reason, which considers an agreement’s 
anticompetitive and procompetitive effects. Such a framework “consider[s] 
traditional antitrust factors such as likely anticompetitive effects, redeeming 
virtues, market power, and potentially offsetting legal considerations.”13 As 
part of the proposed analysis, the Court allowed plaintiffs to use shortcuts to 
demonstrate anticompetitive effects and market power.14 And it anticipated 
that defendants would bear the burden of demonstrating a payment’s 
justifications.15 
III. FIVE FACTORS: FRAMEWORK 
The Lamictal and Loestrin courts purported to apply an analysis based 
on the rule of reason. But they diverged from the Supreme Court in 
centering their analysis on five factors discussed in Actavis. The Lamictal 
court stated that “[t]he Actavis opinion lays out ‘five considerations’ to 
guide district courts in applying the rule of reason.”16 And the Loestrin court 
agreed that “[o]stensibly to assist the lower courts, Actavis set forth five 
‘considerations’ to guide the inquiry as to whether a settlement payment 
satisfies the rule of reason.”17 
 
10
  Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2234. 
11
  Id. at 2233. 
12
  Id. at 2234–35. 
13
  Id. at 2231. Courts engage in a more comprehensive analysis under the rule of reason than they 
conduct under the per se review applicable to price-fixing, output-limitation, and market-allocation 
agreements. See, e.g., Palmer v. BRG of Ga., Inc., 498 U.S. 46 (1990) [http://perma.cc/SR2M-K3X9]. 
14
  Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2234, 2236 (explaining that exclusion payments have the “potential for 
genuine adverse effects on competition” and that the “size of the payment” can serve as “a strong 
indicator of [market] power”). 
15
  Id. at 2236–37 (“An antitrust defendant may show in the antitrust proceeding that legitimate 
justifications are present,” such as saved litigation costs or “fair value for services . . . . [O]ne who 
makes such a payment may be unable to explain and to justify it.”). 
16
  In re Lamictal Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., No. 12–cv–995 (WHW), 2014 WL 282755, at *5 
(D.N.J. Jan. 24, 2014) (quoting and citing Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2234–37). 
17
  In re Loestrin 24 FE Antitrust Litig., MDL No. 13–2472–S–PAS, 2014 WL 4368924, at *8 
(D.R.I. Sept. 4, 2014). Other courts have similarly erred in making this assertion though they have not 
N O R T H W E S T E R N U N I V E R S I T Y L A W R E V I E W O N L I N E 
 116 
Actavis did not, however, introduce the five factors as the foundation 
of a new and unique rule-of-reason analysis. The Court’s intended analysis 
followed the familiar antitrust framework that “consider[s] traditional 
antitrust factors such as likely anticompetitive effects, redeeming virtues, 
market power, and potentially offsetting legal considerations.”18 
Instead, the Court employed the five factors for a very different reason: 
to show why the “general legal policy favoring the settlement of disputes” 
did not displace ordinary antitrust analysis.19 This was important. For the 
decade before the Actavis decision, most appellate courts that had 
considered exclusion-payment agreements had immunized them largely 
based on the policy in favor of settlements, which conserve resources and 
provide certainty. For example, the Eleventh Circuit in Schering-Plough 
Corp. v. FTC found that “[t]he general policy of the law is to favor the 
settlement of litigation, and the policy extends to the settlement of patent 
infringement suits.”20 Similarly, the Federal Circuit in In re Ciprofloxacin 
Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation highlighted the “long-standing policy in 
the law in favor of settlements, [which] extends to patent infringement 
litigation.”21 
Courts also deferred to settlements so as not to harm incentives for 
innovation. The Tamoxifen court stated that rules “severely restricting” 
settlements could hamper the patent system’s goals by increasing 
uncertainty and delaying innovation.22 Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit in 
Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharmaceuticals, Inc. concluded that reduced 
settlement options would raise enforcement costs and “impair . . . incentives 
for disclosure and innovation.”23 And the Schering-Plough court found that 
“the caustic environment of patent litigation” could reduce innovation by 
increasing the “uncertainty around the drug manufacturer’s ability to 
research, develop, and market the patented product.”24 
The influence of the pro-settlement policy explains why the Supreme 
Court tackled this argument head-on. To support its conclusion that the 
policy did not immunize exclusion-payment settlements, the Court 
employed five wide-ranging arguments that centered on exclusion 
 
ordered their analysis around the five factors. See, e.g., In re Effexor XR Antitrust Litig., Civil Action 
No. 11-5479 (PGS) (LHG), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142206, at *59 (D.N.J. Oct. 6, 2014) (“[T]he 
Supreme Court specifically raised the following five sets of considerations to guide its rule of reason 
analysis . . . .”) [http://perma.cc/RV23-EFXE]; In re Lipitor Antitrust Litig., Civil Action No. 3:12-cv-
02389 (PGS), slip op. at 23 (D.N.J. Sept. 12, 2014) (same) [http://perma.cc/A27G-588U]. 
18
  Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2231. For a discussion of plaintiffs’ ability to use exclusion payments as 
shortcuts in proving anticompetitive effects and market power, see supra note 14. 
19
  Id. at 2234. 
20
  402 F.3d 1056, 1072 (11th Cir. 2005). 
21
  544 F.3d 1323, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
22
  In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 203 (2d Cir. 2006). 
23
  344 F.3d 1294, 1308 (11th Cir. 2003) [http://perma.cc/4L4U-5KN3]. 
24
  Schering-Plough, 402 F.3d at 1075. 
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payments’ (1) anticompetitive effects, (2) lack of justification, and (3) 
market power, along with (4) the feasibility of judicial analysis and (5) 
parties’ ability to settle without payment.25 
In case there were any doubt as to the Court’s use of the factors, it 
made clear that “these [five] considerations, taken together, outweigh the 
single strong consideration—the desirability of settlements—that led the 
Eleventh Circuit to provide near-automatic antitrust immunity to reverse 
payment settlements.”26 Applied to the case, the Court explained that “the 
FTC should have been given the opportunity to prove its antitrust claim.”27 
In contrast to the Supreme Court’s unmistakable use of the factors to 
open a courthouse door that had been slammed shut by excessive deference 
to the policy supporting settlements, the Lamictal and Loestrin courts used 
the factors to conclude that the plaintiffs should not be given an opportunity 
to prove their antitrust claim. In addition to using the five factors for very 
different reasons than in Actavis, the courts adopted policy conclusions the 
Supreme Court had specifically rejected. Finally, the Lamictal court found 
room in the factors to engage in armchair speculation, while the Loestrin 
court imposed astronomically high standards that future plaintiffs will 
almost never be able to satisfy. These problems become painfully apparent 
through analysis of each of the factors. 
IV. FIVE FACTORS: APPLICATION 
The framework that the Lamictal and Loestrin courts used to analyze 
exclusion-payment settlements was wrong not only in the theory of the 
Supreme Court’s anticipated antitrust analysis, but also in the application of 
each of the five factors. Each of the factors was marred by analysis based 
on speculation and the imposition of requirements nowhere found in—and 
sometimes directly contrary to—Actavis. 
A. Factor One: Adverse Effects on Competition 
For the first factor, the Lamictal court assumed that “the settlement 
does not have the potential for genuine adverse effects on competition.”28 
The settlement involved a brand’s promise not to introduce its own generic, 
known as an “authorized generic,” during the 180-day period reserved for 
the first generic to file a “Paragraph IV” certification challenging a brand’s 
patent, claiming that it is invalid or not infringed.29 Authorized generics are 
approved by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) as brand drugs 
 
25
  FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2234–37 (2013). 
26
  Id. at 2237. 
27
  Id. at 2234. 
28
  In re Lamictal Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., No. 12–cv–995 (WHW), 2014 WL 282755, at 
*10 (D.N.J. Jan. 24, 2014). 
29
  Id. at *2; see also 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV) (2013) [http://perma.cc/UTW5-DWGB]. 
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but marketed as generics.30 Even though the 180-day period is designed to 
encourage generic entry and is uniquely valuable (potentially worth 
hundreds of millions of dollars)31 to the first-filing generic, the brand is free 
to introduce its own generic version during the period.32 
A Federal Trade Commission study on authorized generics found that 
the first-filing generic’s revenues are approximately twice as high when it 
enjoys the 180-day period without an authorized generic.33 In addition, the 
first filer loses 25% of its market share when it competes with an authorized 
generic during the 180-day period.34 Given the value provided by a brand’s 
promise not to introduce an authorized generic, the Lamictal court was too 
hasty to assume the absence of the “potential for genuine adverse effects on 
competition.”35 
Nor are the reasons the court offered for its conclusion persuasive. The 
court found solace in the fact that the generic “was allowed six months of 
early entry,” that there were no monetary payments, and that the duration of 
the agreement was a “relatively brief six months.”36 But “six months of 
early entry” assumes that the brand was entitled to block entry until the end 
of the patent term—an assumption that Actavis expressly rejected.37 In 
addition, the court ignored fundamental economics in viewing money as 
completely different from a promise worth an equivalent amount of 
money.38 Finally, the suggestion that the no-authorized-generic pledge 
covered a relatively brief six months ignores the well-known economics of 
the pharmaceutical industry (in which drug prices decrease as the number of 
generics on the market increases),39 not to mention Actavis’s express 
acknowledgement that “the vast majority of potential profits for a generic 
drug manufacturer materialize during the 180–day exclusivity period.”40 
 
30
  FTC, AUTHORIZED GENERIC DRUGS, at i (2011) [http://perma.cc/LQ6V-65GP]. 
31
  Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2235. 
32
  See Mylan Pharms., Inc. v. FDA, 454 F.3d 270, 275–76 (4th Cir. 2006) [http://perma.cc/E3QQ-
CA3F]; Teva Pharm. Indus. v. Crawford, 410 F.3d 51, 55 (D.C. Cir. 2005) [http://perma.cc/N26G-
4JS2]. 
33
  FTC, supra note 30, at 58–59. Even after the exclusivity period, the effects continue, with 
revenues of the first-filing generic 53% to 62% lower in the 30 months following exclusivity. Id. at iii. 
34
  Id. at 57. 
35
  In re Lamictal Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., No. 12–cv–995 (WHW), 2014 WL 282755, at 
*10 (D.N.J. Jan. 24, 2014). 
36
  Id. 
37
  Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2231. Such an argument is a variation on the “scope of the patent” test that 
the Federal, Second, and Eleventh Circuits had followed in the decade before the Supreme Court 
decisively rejected it in Actavis. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
38
  See Michael A. Carrier, Payment After Actavis, 100 IOWA L. REV. 7, 35–47 (2014) 
[http://perma.cc/8ED2-BAVL]. 
39




  Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2229. 
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While the Lamictal court incorrectly assumed a lack of competitive 
harm, the Loestrin court erred by imposing hurdles never envisioned by 
Actavis. This court claimed that Actavis suggested that application of the 
first factor on adverse competitive effects “requires a comparison of the 
anticipated supracompetitive profits associated with continued monopoly 
sale of the product, and the sum paid to the generic competitor.”41 The 
Loestrin court even claimed that “it would be all but impossible to assess 
the ‘potential for genuine adverse effects on competition’ without the 
ability to compare the expected monopoly profits to the size of the 
patentee’s payment.”42 
But Actavis never required such a comparison. Instead, the Court 
highlighted the harms from payment and confirmed that the presence of 
multiple generics would not prevent brands from entering into settlements. 
It explained that a brand’s payment is essentially “a purchase . . . of the 
exclusive right to sell its product” (which it would lose if it lost the patent 
litigation) and that “payment in return for staying out of the market [] 
simply keeps prices at patentee-set levels.”43 Additionally, the Court 
confirmed that brands would be able to enter into settlements (and that there 
were not too may challengers to “buy off”) because of the unique position 
possessed by first-filing generics.44 
To support its requirement for comparing monopoly profits and 
payment size, the Loestrin court quoted a passage from Actavis that a 
payment may “‘provide strong evidence that the patentee seeks to induce 
the generic . . . to abandon its claim with a share of its monopoly profits.’”45 
But this passage only references a brand’s ability to use its monopoly 
profits to induce a generic to drop its claim. It does not even hint at precise 
calculations of monopoly profits and generic payment, let alone a 
comparison between the two. As discussed below, such a high bar 
effectively blocks plaintiffs from court.46 
 
41
  In re Loestrin 24 FE Antitrust Litig., MDL No. 13–2472–S–PAS, 2014 WL 4368924, at *8 
(D.R.I. Sept. 4, 2014). 
42
  Id. at *9 (quoting Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2234). 
43
  Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2234. The Court explained that high prices could produce “the full patent-
related . . . monopoly return while dividing that return between the challenged patentee and the patent 
challenger.” Id. at 2234–35. But it used the phrase “monopoly return” not to require plaintiffs to show an 
exact amount but to make clear that the patentee and challenger divide the return, which leads to “[t]he 
patentee and the challenger gain[ing and] the consumer los[ing].” Id. at 2235. 
44
  Id. at 2235. 
45
  Loestrin, 2014 WL 4368924, at *8 (quoting Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2235). 
46
  Two recent opinions (authored by the same judge) set a similarly elevated bar in requiring non-
monetary payments to be “converted to a reliable estimate of its monetary value so that it may be 
analyzed against the Actavis factors such as whether it is ‘large’ once the subtraction of legal fees and 
other services provided by generics occurs.” In re Lipitor Antitrust Litig., Civil Action No. 3:12-cv-
02389 (PGS), slip op. at 32 (D.N.J. Sept. 12, 2014); see also In re Effexor XR Antitrust Litig., 2014 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142206, at *63 (D.N.J. Oct. 6, 2014). The Lipitor court even required the plaintiffs to 
prove the patentee’s lost profits through showings of “(1) demand for the product; (2) absence of 
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B. Factor Two: Unjustified Payments 
Turning to the second factor, the Lamictal court erred by mystically 
finding that the payment at issue was justified.47 It reached this conclusion 
by speculating that the brand “may . . . have derived some ancillary benefit 
from [the generic’s] licensed sales . . . in terms of distribution and 
marketing.”48 But such speculation is not appropriate: it is the defendant’s 
burden to prove procompetitive justifications, not the court’s function to 
assume them. 
Compounding its error, the Lamictal court found that “the 
consideration which the parties exchanged in the settlement is reasonably 
related to the removal of the uncertainty created by the dispute.”49 But 
Actavis was unambiguous in instructing that eliminating the risk that the 
patent would be found invalid or not infringed—the risk that competition 
would break out—is anticompetitive, not procompetitive. The payment 
“likely seeks to prevent the risk of competition,” which “constitutes the 
relevant anticompetitive harm.”50 Finally, the court’s admission that the 
consideration “likely exceeds what the parties would have spent litigating 
the patent dispute”51 shows that the settling patent litigants would not have 
been able to rely on Actavis’s justification for payments not exceeding 
litigation costs. 
The Loestrin court committed a different error in its analysis of the 
second factor of unjustified anticompetitive effects. In particular, it raised 
the bar beyond Actavis by requiring the plaintiffs’ complaint to plead the 
“monetary value of the settlement payment.”52 Requiring plaintiffs to prove 
that the defendants’ business deal exceeded “fair value” contravenes 
Actavis’s holding that defendants have the burden of proof on this 
procompetitive justification.53 And requiring plaintiffs to negate this 
justification in their complaint, when defendants possess the evidence 
relating to the justifications for and valuations of the payment does not 
make sense.54 
 
noninfringing substitutes; (3) manufacturing and marketing capability; and (4) the amount of profit.” 
Lipitor, slip op. at 35. This sets the bar too high: not only would plaintiffs not be able to make these 
showings (let alone on a motion to dismiss) but also the Actavis Court made clear that it is defendants 
that bear the burden of justifying payments for services. See infra Part IV.D. 
47
  In re Lamictal Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., No. 12–cv–995 (WHW), 2014 WL 282755, at 
*10 (D.N.J. Jan. 24, 2014). 
48
  Id. 
49
  Id. 
50
  FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2236 (2013). 
51
  Lamictal, 2014 WL 282755, at *10. 
52
  In re Loestrin 24 FE Antitrust Litig., MDL No. 13–2472–S–PAS, 2014 WL 4368924, at *9 
(D.R.I. Sept. 4, 2014). 
53
  Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2236; see also supra note 15. 
54
  See infra notes 90–91 and accompanying text. 
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C. Factor Three: Market Power 
For the third factor, the Lamictal court could not “conclude whether 
the brand . . . has the market power needed to bring about anticompetitive 
harm,” but it found that “this would not be dispositive.”55 Rather than 
requiring courts to engage in detailed analyses of market power, however, 
Actavis explained that a firm without market power is unlikely to pay large 
sums to keep others out of its market.56 The Lamictal court failed to 
recognize that a brand’s promise not to launch an authorized generic can 
easily reflect “higher-than-competitive profits—a strong indication of 
market power.”57 
The Loestrin court fumbled the ball here, too. In Actavis, the Court 
used the third factor to show that the pro-settlement policy did not 
immunize settlements because plaintiffs could rely on certain payments 
themselves to show market power. To the contrary, the Loestrin court stated 
that courts “must consider whether the size of the reverse payment indicates 
that the patentee held sufficient market power to ‘work unjustified 
anticompetitive harm.’”58 And the court worked backwards from that false 
premise to the conclusion that only cash payments are subject to antitrust 
scrutiny because it is too difficult for courts to calculate the size of non-cash 
payments. 
But the Supreme Court never stated or implied that the only way for a 
plaintiff to plead or prove market power was through the size of the 
payment. And in addition to the payment, the Loestrin plaintiffs pled that 
“[a]t all relevant times, [the brand’s] price for Loestrin 24 has been at least 
60% above its marginal cost of production, and at least 40% above its 
marginal cost including marketing costs.”59 The plaintiffs also alleged that 
the brand “has never lowered the price of Loestrin 24 in response to the 
pricing of other branded oral contraceptives (or the generic versions of 
those other branded oral contraceptives).”60 
D. Factor Four: Feasibility 
Fourth, Actavis held that “the size of the unexplained reverse payment 
can provide a workable surrogate for a patent’s weakness,” obviating the 
need for courts to try a patent case within an antitrust case.61 The Lamictal 
court, however, turned this around, concluding that “the sweep of the 
 
55
  Lamictal, 2014 WL 282755, at *10. 
56
  Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2236. 
57
  Id. 
58
  In re Loestrin 24 FE Antitrust Litig., MDL No. 13–2472–S–PAS, 2014 WL 4368924, at *8 
(D.R.I. Sept. 4, 2014) (quoting Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2236). 
59
  Consolidated Class Action Complaint at ¶ 144, In re Loestrin 24 FE Antitrust Litig., MDL No. 
13–2472–S–PAS, 2014 WL 4368924 (D.R.I. Sept. 4, 2014) [http://perma.cc/D9L2-C2HS]. 
60
  Id. 
61
  Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2236–37. 
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settlement [did] not suggest that it [was] intended to maintain 
supracompetitive prices and serve as a ‘workable surrogate for a patent’s 
weakness.’”62 
This was completely backward. Actavis did not add an intent 
requirement into rule-of-reason analysis. The Supreme Court was referring 
to courts using the payment as a “surrogate” for patent weakness (analyzing 
the payment rather than re-litigating the patent merits), not to parties having 
an intent to use the payment to mask patent weakness. In addition, it would 
seem presumptuous to assume that the parties did not intend an 
anticompetitive effect when they paid and received the payment 
immediately after a court had ruled that a claim of the patent covering the 
drug’s active ingredient was invalid.63 
The Loestrin court similarly failed to recognize that Actavis employed 
the fourth factor to show the feasibility of antitrust actions on the grounds 
that “it is normally not necessary to litigate patent validity to answer the 
antitrust question,” and in fact, “[a]n unexplained large reverse payment 
itself would normally suggest that the patentee has serious doubts about the 
patent’s survival.”64 But again, the Loestrin court put the burden on the 
plaintiff to divine a precise value of the payment as a surrogate for a 
patent’s weakness.65 In other words, if the plaintiff could not provide an 
exact value, it would not be able to use the payment to demonstrate that the 
patent likely was invalid or not infringed. Both courts thus took a factor 
from Actavis that allowed plaintiffs to show patent weakness and twisted it 
into an intent defense that courts could invoke to justify settlement. 
E. Factor Five: Other Settlements 
Fifth, the Lamictal court stated that “the parties settled in a way that 
did not involve monetary reverse payments.”66 Referring again to “early” 
entry and a “limited” six-month period of no authorized-generic entry, the 
court ensured that the settling parties had the “latitude to settle without 
triggering the antitrust scrutiny that large, unjustified reverse payments 
bring.”67 But again, Actavis taught the exact opposite lesson in its reminder 
that litigating parties had ways to settle that did not involve payment.68 Far 
 
62
  In re Lamictal Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., No. 12–cv–995 (WHW), 2014 WL 282755, at 
*10 (D.N.J. Jan. 24, 2014) (quoting Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2236–37). 
63
  Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint at ¶ 18, In re Lamictal Direct Purchaser Antitrust 
Litig., No. 12–cv–995 (WHW), 2014 WL 282755 (D.N.J. Jan. 24, 2014) (noting that the generic “had 
already succeeded in invalidating Claim 1 of the ‘017 patent covering the active ingredient of Lamictal” 
and alleging that “the remaining claims of the patent at issue were extremely weak and highly likely to 
be held invalid”) [http://perma.cc/56PS-Q5X7]. 
64
  Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2236. 
65
  Loestrin, 2014 WL 4368924, at *9. 
66
  Lamictal, 2014 WL 282755, at *10. 
67
  Id. 
68
  Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2237 (noting that litigating parties may “settle in other ways, for example, 
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from revealing an intent to give patent litigants the leeway to settle with 
payment, the Supreme Court made clear that the antitrust laws are likely to 
forbid arrangements by which the settling parties “maintain and . . . share 
patent-generated monopoly profits.”69 
The Loestrin court ventured even further afield in asserting that courts 
should “assess the payment in light of the reasons given for its having been 
made.”70 In Actavis, the Court highlighted the need for antitrust liability 
when the parties seek to maintain and share patent-generated monopoly 
profits. But the Court did not anticipate an open-ended assessment of the 
reasons for the payment. Nor did it expect plaintiffs to be required to 
demonstrate a precise settlement value and compare it to monopoly profits 
to discern the “basic reason” for the settlement.71 
 
 * * * 
 
In short, the Lamictal and Loestrin courts applied an antitrust analysis 
that used the five factors in a manner directly contrary to the Supreme 
Court’s opinion in Actavis. The Court applied the factors to show that the 
pro-settlement policy should not immunize exclusion-payment settlements 
and allow the FTC to prove its case. In contrast, the Lamictal and Loestrin 
courts used the factors to block plaintiffs from proving their cases. The 
Lamictal court assumed that there were no anticompetitive effects, that 
payments were justified, and that there was no intent to maintain monopoly 
prices.72 The Loestrin court supplemented this speculation by imposing the 
hurdle of calculating a “true value” and by punishing plaintiffs that were not 
able to make such a determination, finding that they would not be able to 
show anticompetitive effects, unjustified payments, market power, patent 
weakness, or the “basic reason” for settlement.73 
V. UNHEEDED HOLDINGS 
The Lamictal and Loestrin courts also erred in disregarding four 
essential holdings from Actavis, which addressed (1) the public policy in 
favor of settlement; (2) parties’ inability to settle cases without exclusion 
payments; (3) the elimination of risk as a justification; and (4) the burdens 
imposed on plaintiffs. 
 
by allowing the generic manufacturer to enter the patentee's market prior to the patent's expiration, 
without the patentee paying the challenger to stay out prior to that point”). 
69
  Id. 
70
  Loestrin, 2014 WL 4368924, at *9. 
71
  See Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2237. 
72
  In re Lamictal Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., No. 12–cv–995 (WHW), 2014 WL 282755, at 
*10 (D.N.J. Jan. 24, 2014). 
73
  Loestrin, 2014 WL 4368924, at *9, *12 (asserting that “each of the five Actavis factors plainly 
requires” the comparing of brand revenues to the payment). 
N O R T H W E S T E R N U N I V E R S I T Y L A W R E V I E W O N L I N E 
 124 
A. Settlement Policy 
The first unheeded holding involved an excessive deference to the 
public policy reasons in support of settlement. As discussed above, this 
policy played a role in appellate courts’ insufficient scrutiny of settlements 
in the decade before Actavis.74 The Loestrin court asserted that “the fact that 
the majority and the dissent recognize and promote the public policy value 
of patent settlements[] suggests that Actavis should be read to apply solely 
to the cash settlements that it describes, and to exclude non-cash 
settlements, preserving for litigants a viable path to resolve their disputes.”75 
In contrast to the Loestrin court’s assertion, the Actavis Court 
exhaustively detailed why the policy in favor of settlement was not 
commanding enough to outweigh the other policy considerations favoring 
antitrust scrutiny of exclusion-payment settlements. The Loestrin court’s 
disregard of this holding was particularly ironic given Actavis’s invocation 
of five factors to rebut the policy and the Loestrin court’s own application 
of the five factors (albeit for a contrary objective). Along similar lines, the 
Loestrin court’s statement that the Actavis majority “recognize[d] and 
promote[d] the public policy value of patent settlements” is brazen in its 
disregard of the Supreme Court’s holding.76 
B. Need for Exclusion Payments 
Second, the Lamictal and Loestrin courts worried that applying 
antitrust scrutiny to non-cash settlements would reduce patent litigants’ 
ability to settle. The Lamictal court stated that Actavis “made clear its intent 
to give patent litigants latitude to settle without triggering the antitrust 
scrutiny that large, unjustified reverse payments bring.”77 In addition, the 
court found that denying a safe harbor for anything other than entry-date 
settlements (without payment) would “far too greatly constrict parties’ 
power to settle, a power the Actavis court clearly meant to keep intact.”78 
The Loestrin court went even further, avowing that “there can be no 
dispute that the holding in Actavis and the abandonment of the scope-of-
the-patent test will make it more difficult for patent litigants to settle.”79 But 
this court oddly relied on an article written by a lawyer who has represented 
defendants in exclusion-payment settlement cases rather than the Supreme 
Court, which directly addressed the issue.80 Nor was the Loestrin court 
 
74
  See supra notes 20-24 and accompanying text. 
75
  Loestrin, 2014 WL 4368924, at *11. 
76
  Id. 
77
  Lamictal, 2014 WL 282755, at *10. 
78
  Id. at *7 n.4. 
79
  Loestrin, 2014 WL 4368924, at *11. 
80
  See id. (citing Kevin D. McDonald, Because I Said So: On the Competitive Rationale of FTC v. 
Actavis, ANTITRUST, Fall 2013, at 36, 42 (noting representation of “defendants in all of the 
Ciprofloxacin cases” and in the Nexium case) [http://perma.cc/B69D-DY3J]). 
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correct that the Supreme Court rendered non-cash settlements immune from 
antitrust scrutiny to “preserv[e] for litigants a viable path to resolve their 
disputes.”81 
In Actavis, the Justices made clear that the risk of antitrust liability 
from payment “does not prevent litigating parties from settling their 
lawsuit.”82 The Court pointed out that parties could pursue alternative forms 
of settlement, such as “allowing the generic manufacturer to enter the 
patentee’s market prior to the patent’s expiration, without the patentee 
paying the challenger to stay out prior to that point.”83 
These agreements, by which brands and generics divide the patent term 
by selecting a time for generic entry, tend to reflect the odds of success in 
patent litigation (and thus do not present similar antitrust concern).84 And 
the settlements are more than possible—in fact, they are typical, as shown 
by a recent FTC report that more than 70% of settlements do not involve 
payment or delayed generic entry.85 
C. Risk as Justification 
The Lamictal court also erred in accepting the elimination of patent 
risk as a justification the defendants could offer to excuse their settlement. 
The court found that “the consideration which the parties exchanged in the 
settlement is reasonably related to the removal of the uncertainty created by 
the dispute.”86 But, as discussed above, Actavis clearly explained that 
eliminating the risk that a patent would be found invalid or not infringed is 
anticompetitive. The payment “likely seeks to prevent the risk of 
competition,” which “constitutes the relevant anticompetitive harm.”87 The 
Lamictal court should not be able to resurrect a justification that the 
Supreme Court specifically considered and rejected. 
 
81
  Id. 
82
  FTC v. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2237 (2013). 
83
  Id. 
84
  HERBERT HOVENKAMP ET AL., 1 IP AND ANTITRUST: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES 
APPLIED TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW § 15.3, at 15–45 (2d ed. Supp. 2012); Robert D. Willig & 
John P. Bigelow, Antitrust Policy Toward Agreements that Settle Patent Litigation, 49 ANTITRUST 
BULL. 655, 660 (2004) [http://perma.cc/T23W-LLP8]. 
85
  See FTC BUREAU OF COMPETITION, AGREEMENTS FILED WITH THE FEDERAL TRADE 
COMMISSION UNDER THE MEDICARE PRESCRIPTION DRUG, IMPROVEMENT, AND MODERNIZATION ACT 
OF 2003: OVERVIEW OF AGREEMENTS FILED IN FY 2012, at 1–2 (2013) [http://perma.cc/4SME-J665]. 
Evidence from Europe is consistent, with the most recent monitoring report concluding that 93% of 
settlements between brands and generics “f[e]ll into categories that prima facie raise no need for 
competition law scrutiny.” European Commission, 4th Report on the Monitoring of Patent Settlements, 
¶ 51 (Dec. 9, 2013) [http://perma.cc/5N77-CY4N]. 
86
  In re Lamictal Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., No. 12–cv–995 (WHW), 2014 WL 282755, at 
*10 (D.N.J. Jan. 24, 2014). 
87
  Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2236 (emphasis omitted). 
N O R T H W E S T E R N U N I V E R S I T Y L A W R E V I E W O N L I N E 
 126 
D. Burdens on Plaintiffs 
Both the Lamictal and Loestrin courts inappropriately shifted several 
burdens to the plaintiffs. The Lamictal court provided an irrebuttable 
presumption that the settlement at issue was procompetitive based on its 
bare assertions that it did not “have the potential for genuine adverse effects 
on competition,” that the payment was justified, and that “the sweep of the 
settlement does not suggest that it is intended to maintain supracompetitive 
prices and serve as a ‘workable surrogate for a patent’s weakness.’”88 
The Loestrin court allowed plaintiffs to try to make these showings. 
But it imposed the entire burden on plaintiffs, asserting that “[c]ritically, 
each of the[] five factors requires, on the part of the plaintiff . . . an ability 
to assess or calculate the true value of the payment.”89 Additionally, if the 
plaintiff could not definitively prove the monetary value of the payment, it 
would be unable to demonstrate that the payment was unjustified.90 
The Actavis Court, however, never envisioned plaintiffs being forced 
to prove each of the factors. The Court explained that “[a]n antitrust 
defendant may show in the antitrust proceeding that legitimate justifications 
are present” and that in some cases the defendant might be “unable to 
explain and to justify [its payment].”91 Putting the burden on defendants is 
consistent with their ability to justify a payment by showing that it reflects 
saved litigation costs or “fair value for services.”92 
In addition to shifting inappropriate burdens to plaintiffs, the Loestrin 
court raised the burdens to extremely high levels, requiring plaintiffs to 
show a payment’s “true value” and asserting that the failure to make such a 
precise calculation would prevent them from showing each of the factors it 
expected plaintiffs to prove: anticompetitive effect, unjustified payment, 
market power, patent weakness, and the reasons for settlement.93 
The Loestrin court recognized that this imposed insurmountable 
burdens on plaintiffs. The court admitted that the pleading standard 
articulated in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly94 requires only “plausible 
grounds to infer an agreement” and “does not impose a probability 
 
88
  Lamictal, 2014 WL 282755, at *10. 
89
  In re Loestrin 24 FE Antitrust Litig., MDL No. 13–2472–S–PAS, 2014 WL 4368924, at *9 
(D.R.I. Sept. 4, 2014). 
90
  Id. (citing Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2236). 
91
  Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2236–37. 
92
  Id. at 2236; see also Aaron Edlin et al., Activating Actavis, ANTITRUST, Fall 2013, at 18 (noting 
that “defendants are in possession of the relevant evidence about their side deals,” that “complexity is 
the result of the defendants’ own actions,” and that “[t]he parties to a payment for delay have ample 
reason to pack complexities into the deal (such as relatively unimportant services) to conceal its genuine 
nature”) [http://perma.cc/59QW-6YKA]. 
93
  Loestrin, 2014 WL 4368924, at *9. The court even created the rule that “in reverse payment 
contexts where rule of reason scrutiny is not applicable, dismissal is required.” Id. at *12. 
94
  550 U.S. 544 (2007) [http://perma.cc/BPB9-9WRP]. 
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requirement.”95 In fact, the Loestrin court confessed that the plaintiffs had 
submitted “two robust complaints” containing “facts demonstrating illegal 
contracts or combinations in restraint of trade.”96 
In contravention of its exhortations to show a payment’s “true value,” 
however, the court conceded that the plaintiffs “(understandably) 
struggle[d] to affix a precise dollar value” to the brand’s non-cash payment 
for delay, and that “[t]his should come as no surprise because pleading facts 
sufficient to glean the monetary value of non-cash settlements is a tall task, 
one that would typically require considerable discovery to achieve.”97 
Further arguing against itself, the court explained that this was 
“particularly true” when a “settlement involves licenses and co-promotion 
arrangements for other drugs and a ‘no authorized generic’ agreement,” as 
these arrangements make “even a ballpark estimate . . . difficult to 
conjure.”98 In short, the Loestrin court recognized that plaintiffs would not 
be able to demonstrate a precise value for payment and that its ruling was 
not consistent with the Supreme Court’s opinion in Twombly. Despite these 
legitimate concerns, the court nonetheless forged ahead by manufacturing 
out of whole cloth precision requirements from Actavis. And it applied 
these creations to dismiss plaintiffs’ claims even though it conceded that 
“the [p]laintiffs have adequately pled the existence of a Sherman Act § 1 
violation.”99 
VI. JUDICIAL BLAME-SHIFTING 
In addition to misapplying the rule-of-reason framework and 
neglecting four crucial Actavis holdings, the Loestrin court placed the 
blame for its opinion squarely on the Supreme Court. The court lamented 
that if the Supreme Court had “intended for rule of reason scrutiny to apply 
to non-cash settlements, it could simply have said so.”100 But this 
unsuccessful attempt at judicial blame-shifting merely highlights problems 
with the Loestrin court’s own reasoning. 
The Loestrin court concluded that Actavis permits antitrust scrutiny of 
only cash payments because calculating the value of an above-market-value 
business deal is too difficult and therefore does not satisfy the five factors. 
 
95
  Loestrin, 2014 WL 4368924, at *11 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). 
96
  Id. 
97
  Id. 
98
  Id. 
99
  Id. at *12. Heightened burdens on plaintiffs also result from the three-part test that the Lamictal 
court created (and Loestrin court followed), which asks (1) if there is a reverse payment and (2) if such a 
payment is large and unjustified, followed by (3) the rule of reason. Id. at *7; In re Lamictal Direct 
Purchaser Antitrust Litig., No. 12–cv–995 (WHW), 2014 WL 282755, at *5 (D.N.J. Jan. 24, 2014). Such 
a framework imposes burdens on plaintiffs (who, for example, are required to show that the payment is 
unjustified) and can put undue emphasis on cash payments. 
100
  Loestrin, 2014 WL 4368924, at *11. 
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But Loestrin lost track of the obvious fact that Actavis itself involved not a 
cash payment, but an above-market-value business deal. As the Supreme 
Court explained: “[t]he companies described these payments as 
compensation for other services the generics promised to perform, but the 
FTC contends the other services had little value.”101 The Loestrin court thus 
was not correct in asserting that Actavis’s analysis precludes scrutiny of a 
payment in the very form that the Supreme Court held is subject to scrutiny 
and as to which it reversed the complaint’s dismissal.102 To state it gently, 
this is a good indicator that Loestrin’s reading of Actavis is wrong. 
Pointing to an additional form of payment—the no-authorized-generic 
clause—Loestrin lamented that Actavis did not address all of the non-cash 
forms that an unlawful payment might take. But it is not realistic to expect 
the Court to address every issue that could conceivably arise in any future 
case, including the form that every such agreement could take. The Court 
decided numerous contested issues for the first time in Actavis, including 
(1) the role of antitrust law in reviewing exclusion-payment settlements, (2) 
the effect of the “scope of the patent” test, (3) the effect of the policy 
favoring settlements, (4) whether brands could pay off all the relevant 
generics, (5) which justifications the Court would allow the settling parties 
to offer, (6) the feasibility of antitrust analysis of exclusion-payment 
settlements, (7) whether the payment provides any information about the 
patent merits, (8) the ability of the parties to settle without exclusion 
payments, and (9) the type of analysis that future courts should apply.103 Is it 
any surprise that the Court (additionally justifying its ruling against three 
dissenting Justices) did not address every possible permutation of 
settlement and conveyance of non-cash consideration? 
The Loestrin court soberly considered its role as a loyal foot soldier in 
the process of developing the common law, which is marked by “stability” 
and undergoes an “evolution [that] takes place gradually and incrementally 
and usually in a direction that can be predicted.”104 But it recognized that the 
Actavis decision would “only serve as the solution to anticompetitive pay 
for delay arrangements insofar as it encompasses both cash and these 
increasingly prevalent non-cash settlements.”105 In fact, the court recognized 
that patent settlements were increasingly taking non-cash forms.106 
 
101
  FTC v. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2229 (2013). 
102
  Compare id. (describing payments for “other services the generics promised to perform”) with 
Loestrin, 2014 WL 4368924, at *4 (describing payments for generic’s co-promotion of unrelated drug). 
103
  Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2230–38. 
104
  Loestrin, 2014 WL 4368924, at *10. 
105
  Id. at *12. 
106
  Id. The Loestrin court’s error in failing to acknowledge that Actavis itself involved an above-
market-value business deal infiltrated its analysis of the no-authorized-generic provision. The complaint 
in Actavis alleged that through the side agreement, “in substance, the plaintiff agreed to pay the 
defendants many millions of dollars to stay out of its market.” Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2231 (emphasis 
added). The Loestrin court failed to recognize its duty to determine whether the no-authorized-generic 
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Ironically, the Loestrin court understood that “it is of relatively little 
import whether a payment for delay is made in the form of cash or some 
other form of consideration.”107 The reason is that “[w]hen a patent holder 
pays a would-be generic competitor to stay out of the market—regardless of 
the form of the payment—value is exchanged and the brand manufacturer is 
able to continue on with fewer competitors.”108 
In other words, the court recognized that its “cautious” approach would 
lead to insufficient scrutiny.109 In fact, the court admitted that its ruling 
would result in “pharmaceutical companies tak[ing] the obvious cue to 
structure their settlements in ways that avoid cash payments,” which would 
lead to the agreements “evad[ing] Sherman Act scrutiny.”110 It is hard to see 
how a ruling that throws open the barnyard doors to any and all 
anticompetitive settlements, even in a case that the court conceded met 
Twombly’s pleading requirements, charts a defensible course to the analysis 
of conduct that “tend[s] to have significant adverse effects on 
competition.”111 
CONCLUSION 
In Actavis, the Supreme Court emphasized the dire harms that result 
when brands pay generics to delay entering the market. And it made clear 
that future courts would apply the rule of reason to this conduct, bestowing 
on plaintiffs potential shortcuts to show anticompetitive harm and market 
power, and imposing burdens on defendants to show justifications based on 
litigation costs or unrelated services. 
The Lamictal and Loestrin courts turned this framework on its head. 
They took the five factors that Actavis employed to show why the pro-
defendant policy in favor of settlement was not dispositive and used it, 
combined with armchair speculation and astronomical hurdles, to block 
plaintiffs from the courthouse steps. They did this even at the motion-to-
dismiss stage in contravention of Twombly and in recognition of the fact 
that the requisite evidence was not available until after discovery. 
The two courts got it exactly backwards. The Lamictal court assumed 
the defendants’ case to be true. And the Loestrin court forced plaintiffs to 
bear the burden of proving a precise payment instead of merely recognizing 
the existence of a payment for delayed generic entry. If these decisions are 
allowed to stand and are adopted by other courts, there will be no scrutiny 
of these agreements. The patent litigants will gladly accept the roadmap the 
 
pledge (and above-market-value side deals) in substance alleged the same. 
107
  Loestrin, 2014 WL 4368924, at *12. 
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  Id. 
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  Id. at *10. 
110
  Id. at *12. 
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  Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2231. 
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Loestrin court graciously provided, which will lead them to (as Loestrin 
warned) “evade Sherman Act scrutiny.”112 
Such treatments of Actavis are not consistent with the Court’s 
framework and in fact gut the Court’s decision. Lower courts should not be 
able to read Supreme Court opinions out of existence by adopting 
frameworks antithetical to the opinion, ignoring the Court’s policy 
conclusions, and amassing powers for themselves that the Court never 
anticipated. 
Not only would such a course have catastrophic consequences for our 
judicial system, but it also would return us to the days between 2005 and 
2012, when the courts, applying the scope-of-the-patent test, immunized 
nearly all exclusion-payment settlements. For agreements that cost 
consumers billions of dollars and have dramatic consequences for public 




  Loestrin, 2014 WL 4368924, at *12. 
